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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Dustin Thomas Armstrong appeals from the Judgment of Conviction in which the 
district court adjudged him guilty of grand theft. Mr. Armstrong pleaded guilty to the 
charge, but reserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The district 
court denied Mr. Armstrong's motion to suppress based upon its finding that Boise City 
police officers were "acting as agents of Field and Community Services when they 
conducted the search." In what appears to be an issue of first impression, 
Mr. Armstrong asserts that article X, section 5 of the Idaho Constitution, which places 
the duty of control, direction, and management of parole on the Board of Corrections, 
prevents a probation and parole officer from delegating that responsibility to local police. 
As such, the district court erred in finding that the Boise police officers were agents of 
Field and Community Services at the time of the search. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Thirty-five year old Dustin Armstrong was a parolee under the supervision of the 
Board of Correction. (Tr., p.24, Ls.18-22.)1 As part of his parole agreement, he signed a 
document which stated, in part, "Parolee will submit to a search of person or property, to 
include residence and vehicle, at any time and place by any agent of Field and 
1 The record on appeal includes two transcripts. A transcript of the hearing on 
Mr. Armstrong's motion to suppress held on July 3, 2013, and, as an exhibit, a transcript 
of the preliminary hearing. All transcript citations in this brief are to the transcript of the 
hearing on Mr. Armstrong's motion to suppress. 
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Community and waive constitutional right to be free from such 
1.) 2 
One evening Mr. Armstrong's mother came home to find her car running in the 
driveway with the doors and windows open. When she asked Mr. Armstrong why, he 
informed her that he was charging his cell phone. She told him, "this isn't right," and 
asked him to leave, so he did. (Tr., p.29, L.24 p.30, L.7.) The next morning 
Mr. Armstrong returned. He asked his mother whether there were any accounts with 
money in them for him. She denied having any accounts or any money. He told her 
'That's fine. I'll have my attorney take care of it." (Tr., p.30, Ls.8-21.) Mr. Armstrong's 
mother could tell he was "distracted," and having seen him on methamphetamine 
before, she felt was high, so she told him to pack his things and leave. (Tr., p.30, 
Ls.23-25, p.34, Ls.18-22.) Mr. Armstrong informed his mother, "I just want you to know, 
Mom, when I turn 39, I will have family benefits on my dead mom." (Tr., p.31, Ls.1-5.) 
His mother went to her sister's, called the police, and reported that she believed her son 
was using illegal substances. (Tr., p.31, Ls.6-10.) 
Officer Chally of the Boise Police Department received a dispatch "narcotics call." 
(Tr., p.47, Ls.6-10.) She called the "on-call probation and parole phone number" and 
spoke to Ms. Jeffries. (Tr., p.48, Ls.5-6, p.50, L.25 - p.51, L.1.) Ms. Jeffries is a 
probation and parole officer for District Four Probation and Parole, although she did not 
supervise Mr. Armstrong. (Tr., p.36, Ls.2-5, p.38, L.15.) About once a year she has a 
shift where she is the on-call officer, meaning she has a phone which law enforcement 
2 According to the State, Field and Community Services no longer exists, but was 
renamed Bureau of Probation and Parole. (See R., p.102.) 
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can call. Officers like Officer Chally "call us all the time on it." (Tr., p.37, Ls.4-13.) 
"[P]retty much all of the time, if I get a phone call that they've got a parolee or 
probationer pulled over, I ask for a K9 search of the vehicle." (Tr., p.39, Ls.1-4.) Her 
standard response to hearing that a parolee has been stopped for running a stop sign 
is, "Yes, he's on parole. Can you please search through the vehicle for me?" (Tr., p.42, 
Ls.16-20.) She regularly has other agencies conduct searches, "And it's just the way we 
do things." (Tr., p.42, L.21 - p.43, L.8.) 
Officer Chally spotted Mr. Armstrong leaving his mother's house and followed 
him to a local credit union. (Tr., p.48, L.11 - p.49, L.16.) True to form, Ms. Jeffries asked 
Officer Chally to do a K9 search of Mr. Armstrong's car. (Tr., p.38, Ls.7-23.) Ms. Jeffries 
could have gone down to assist in the search of a parolee, but didn't. (Tr., p.44, Ls.23-
25.) Rather she simply told Officer Chally, "If you find anything, if you need me down 
there, I'll come down." (Tr., p.44, L.12-17.) In fact, no one from probation and parole 
went to where Mr. Armstrong was being confronted by police. (Tr., p.44, Ls.20-22.) 
Mr. Armstrong was inside the bank when two uniformed officers approached him. 
(Tr., p.11, Ls.10-25.) They asked to speak with him so Mr. Armstrong went outside with 
them. (Tr., p.11, L.24 - p.12, L.15.) At this time, the officers weren't aware of any crime 
that Mr. Armstrong had committed. (Tr., p.73, L.24 - p.74, L.2.) When speaking with the 
officers Mr. Armstrong was "calm," "easy, laid-back going," "polite, very respectful" and 
cooperative. (Tr., p.59, L.23 - p.60, L.2, p.79, Ls.10-12.) So the officers searched his 
body in a pat search. (Tr., p.61, Ls.12-14.) 
While Mr. Armstrong was being detained by two officers, Officer Calley had 
Officer Walbey run a K9 search on Mr. Armstrong's car. (Tr., p.89, Ls.1-14.) The dog 
3 
did not alert when he was run on the outside of the car. (Tr., p.91, Ls.5-15.) So, Officer 
Walbey put the dog in the car. (Tr., p.91, Ls.1 8.) Inside, dog alerted on a 
behind the driver's seat. (Tr., p.89, Ls.23-24.) It turned out that the safe belonged to 
Mr. Armstrong's mother, Mr. Armstrong had never opened the safe before, and 
Mr. Armstrong didn't even know what was in the safe. (Tr., p.93, L.19 - p.94, L.16.) His 
mother claimed that she had never stored any drugs in the safe and none were found 
inside. (Tr., p.94, Ls.15-16, p.95, Ls.3-5.) 
Mr. Armstrong was charged with grand theft for taking the safe, which had 
contained a "checkbook and/or financial documents" belonging to his mother. 
(R., pp.37-38.) Counsel filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the 
warrantless search of Mr. Armstrong's car. (R., pp.54-55.) Subsequently an Amended 
Motion to Suppress was filed. (R., pp.63-64.) 
The district court initially granted Mr. Armstrong's motion to suppress, finding that 
the search was unreasonable and "Boise City police are not agents of Field and 
Community Services," such that "the scope of the search exceeded that that [sic] was 
permitted by this waiver, and therefore was an unlawful search." (Tr., p.121, L.23 - 122, 
L.17.) The State filed a motion to reconsider asserting that any law enforcement officer 
acting on behalf of Field and Community Services is permitted to conduct searches of a 
parolee under the plain language of Mr. Armstrong's waiver because they are agents of 
Field and Community Services. (R., pp.96-97.) The State also asserted that Probation 
and Parole had delegated the task of searching Mr. Armstrong's vehicle to Boise police 
officers. (R., pp.101-103.) Upon reconsideration, the district court denied 
Mr. Armstrong's motion to suppress. The court found, "The parole agent in this case 
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authorized Boise City Police Officers to act in place in conducting a search of the 
Defendant's vehicle. This is the very definition of an " (R., pp.116-117.) 
Mr. Armstrong entered into a binding plea agreement with the State wherein he 
reserved his right to challenge the denial of his motion to suppress on appeal. 
(R., pp.126-27.) Following sentencing, the district court entered a Judgment of 
Conviction and Mr. Armstrong timely appealed. (R., pp.134-41.)3 
3 Although the Notice of Appeal was actually filed the day before the Judgment of 
Conviction, pursuant to I.AR. 17(e)(2) it became valid upon the filing of the judgment. 
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ISSUE 
In light of the that article section 5 of the Idaho Constitution specifically places 
duty of control, direction, and management of parole on the Board of Corrections, 
did tr1e district court err when it determined that an on-call probation and parole officer 
can delegate that constitutional duty to local police, thereby making them agents of the 
Board? 
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ARGUMENT 
Because Article X, Section 5 Of The Idaho Constitution Specifically Places The Duty Of 
Control, Direction, And Management Of Parole On The Board Of Corrections, And 
Constitutional Duties Cannot Be Delegated To Another Authority, The District Court 
Erred When It Determined That An On-Call Probation And Parole Officer Can Delegate 
That Constitutional Duty To Local Police Thereby Making Them Agents Of The Board 
As a parolee, Mr. Armstrong waived his constitutional right be free from 
searches of his vehicle "at any time and place by any agent of Field and Community 
Services .... " The district court found that Boise police officers were such agents 
because a probation and parole officer authorized them to search Mr. Armstrong's car. 
However, this finding presupposes that a probation and parole officer has the authority 
to delegate the responsibility of searching a parolee. The Idaho constitution places the 
duty to control, direct, and manage parole on the Board of Corrections. When the 
people, through the constitution, have placed a duty upon a specific agency, that 
agency cannot simply excuse itself from that duty by delegating it to another entity. 
Because the probation and parole officer did not have the authority to delegate the 
constitutional duty to another entity, the Boise police were not agents falling within the 
scope of Mr. Armstrong's waiver. 
Mr. Armstrong did waive his constitutional rights to be free from searches "by any 
agent of Field and Community Services." (Ex.1.) The district court denied 
Mr. Armstrong's motion to suppress finding, "[t]he parole agent in this case authorized 
Boise City Police Officers to act in her place in conducting a search of the Defendant's 
vehicle. This is the very definition of an agent." (R., pp.116-117.) At the heart of this 
ruling, and what it presupposes, is that Ms. Jeffries, a probation and parole officer, had 
the authority to delegate the Board of Correction's constitutional duty to control, direct, 
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Ms. Jeffries did not have that authority, 
the district court erred in finding that Boise police officers were agents of Field and 
Community Services and authorized to search under the terms of Mr. Armstrong's 
waiver. Therefore, this Court should reverse the order denying Mr. Armstrong's motion 
to suppress. 
A. Article X Section 5 Of The Idaho Constitution Specifically Places The Duty Of 
Control, Direction And Management Of Parole On The Board Of Corrections 
The Idaho Constitution creates the Board of Correction and states, "This board 
shall have the control, direction and management of ... adult probation and parole, with 
such compensation, powers, and duties as may be prescribed by law." lo. CONST. art. 
X § While the "Legislature implemented this constitutional directive by enacting" 
statutes, "The enabling acts of the legislature involved no delegation of authority," 
rather, 'The Board ultimately derives its powers from article 10, § 5 of the Idaho 
Constitution." Mellinger v. State Dept. of Corrections, 114 Idaho 494, 499 (Ct. App. 
1988). 
In interpreting this section, the Idaho Supreme Court has found that, although the 
Legislature may define the circumstances under which the Board may exercise its 
authority, the Board continues to have exclusive control over parole once those 
circumstances arise. Determining whether a defendant is eligible for parole during his 
sentence "is within the legislative scope of establishing suitable punishment for the 
various crimes .... " Standlee v. State, 96 Idaho 849, 852 (1975). Thus, "the 
circumstances under which the functions are to be exercised by the state Board of 
corrections are to be prescribed by the laws enacted by the Legislature." State v. 
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Rawson, 100 Idaho 308, 313 (1979). "The board of correction continues to have 
exclusive control over adult probation and parole in situations where the 
legislature has provided by law that parole is available .... " Id. (emphasis added). Under 
this distribution of power, once an adult is placed on parole, the Board maintains 
exclusive control, direction, and management of that parole. 
Moreover, the intent in placing control, direction, and management of parole in 
the Board of Corrections was to professionalize parole supervision and have it executed 
by employees of the Board of Corrections. In 1940, a Prison Committee submitted its 
report to Governor Bottlolfson. (Report of Prison Committee, Appointed January 5, 
1940, (hereinafter, Report).) This committee been appointed to "investigate and 
report on the needs of the State Penitentiary and the Probation and Parole laws .... " 
(Report, Cover Letter, p.1.) The committee noted, "Idaho has has [sic] a probation and 
parole law on its statutes books, which includes many of the essential provisions for a 
good probation and parole system." Id. However, the committee recognized that there 
were problems with the current system. "It's now unsatisfactory operation is based upon 
the fact that there is a complete dirth of qualified administration officers, therefore, it can 
be truthfully said that we have no system of parole and probation of a scientific type 
whatsoever." Id. 
The committee recommended a series of changes be made to better effectuate a 
probation and parole system. (Report, pp.1-2, 6-7.) These recommendations included, 
"The supervision of the paroled offender should be exercised by qualified persons 
trained and experienced in the task of guiding social readjustment." (Report, p. 7.) 
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The committee also recommended that then Article X, § 5 completely stricken 
from the Idaho Constitution.4 (Report, p.9.) 'This will permit the legislature then to 
set up a separate board of penal administration and a board of probation and parole or 
to combine the two in the interest of economy." (Report, p.9.) Another recommended 
change included the creation of a new non-political Board of Correction to also serve as 
a Board of Adult Probation and Parole, the creation of a position of Supervisor of 
Probation and Parole, and the establishment of a probation and parole system for the 
state with full-time, joint probation and parole officers assigned to "serve the courts of 
his district as a Probation Officer and the State penitentiary as a Parole Officer." 
(Report, pp.1, 7.) 
Although many of the changes in regard to the parole system sought by the 
committee were implemented, they were not implemented in exactly the way the 
committee recommended. Instead of simply striking Article X § 5 from the constitution, 
that provision was amended by the Legislature in 1941 and ratified by the people in 
1942. Rather than simply leave the decision of who would supervise parolee's to the 
legislature, it was constitutionally mandated that the Board of Correction have that duty. 
The state legislature shall establish a nonpartisan board to be known as 
the state board of correction, .... This board shall have the control, 
direction and management of the penitentiaries of the state, their 
employees and properties, and of adult probation and parole, with such 
compensation, powers, and duties as may be prescribed by law. 
4 At that time, the provIsIon read: "State Prisons - Control Over. The Governor, 
Secretary of State and Attorney General shall constitute a board to be known as the 
State Prison Commissioners and shall have the control, direction and management of 
the penitentiaries of the state. The Governor shall be chairman, and the board shall 
appoint a warden, who may be removed at pleasure. The warden shall have the power 
to appoint subordinates, subject to the approval of the board." 
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IDAH0 CONST. art. X § 5. In 1947, the Legislature passed enabling statutes establishing 
the State Board of Correction. ( 194 7 Idaho Session Chapter 53, 1-47.) These 
session laws recognized the Board's authority to employ and fix the duties of officers 
"for the administration of the parole and probation system .... " Id. at§ 14. 
This history shows that, with the purpose of professionalizing the parole system, 
the people of Idaho placed the duty to control, direct, and manage parolees on the 
Board of Correction and its employees. 
8. Because The Duty To Control, Direct, And Manage Parole Has Been 
Constitutionally Placed On The Board Of Correction, It Cannot Be Deleqated To 
Another Entity Such As A Local Police Force 
Where the sovereign power of the State, meaning the people, have located 
certain authority it must remain. Cooley, A Treatise On The Constitutional Limitations 
Which Rest Upon The Legislative Power of the States of the American Union (6 th ed. 
1890), p.137; Cf. State v. Purce//, 39 Idaho 642 (1924) (relying upon Cooley to find, 
"One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is that the power conferred upon the 
Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to any other body or 
authority."); In re SRBA Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho 246, 260 (1995) (recognizing "the 
power of the courts to ultimately decide the cases presented to them, granted by Article 
V, Section 20 of the Constitution, has never been, and can never be, delegated to 
executive agencies."). 
In specific reference to the executive duties, "such powers as are specifically 
conferred by the constitution upon the governor, or upon any other specified officer, the 
legislature cannot require or authorize to be performed by any other officer or authority; 
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and from those duties which the constitution requires of him he cannot 
law." Cooley, p.133. 
excused by 
Because the people of the State of Idaho constitutionally mandated that the 
Board of Correction have the duty to supervise parolees, the Board cannot excuse itself 
from this duty by simply delegating it to another entity such as a local police force. 
C. Because The Duty Was Not Delegable The Boise Police Officers Were Not 
Agents Of Field And Community Services 
An agent is a person authorized to act for or in the place of the principal. 
Knutsen v. Cloud, 142 Idaho ·148, 151(2005). "Any person who is sui juris and has 
capacity to his or her legal relationships by giving consent to a delegable act or 
transaction may authorize an agent to act for him or her with the same effect as if such 
person were to act in person." Edwards v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 154 
Idaho 511,517,300 P.3d 43, 49 (2013) (emphasis added), citing 3 Am.Jur.2d Agency§ 
9 (2002). However, "[i]f performance of an act is not delegable, its performance by an 
agent does not constitute performance by the principal." Restatement (Third) Of 
Agency§ 3.04 (2006). 
As argued above, the constitutional duty to supervise parolees was non-
delegable. Thus, Boise police officers searching Mr. Armstrong's car as the 
performance of this duty does not constitute it being done by Field and Community 
Services. Simply put, the officers were not agents of Field and Community Services 
because the probation and parole officer, like the legislature, did not have the power to 
delegate the Board's duty of supervision of parolees. 
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D. Because Mr. Armstrong's Waiver Only Encompassed Actual Agents Of Field And 
Community Services The Warrantless Search Violated Mr. Armstrong's 
Constitutional Rights To Be Free From Unreasonable Searches And Seizures 
Mr. Armstrong provided a waiver of his constitutional rights to free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures which was limited in scope. It stated that he 
would "submit to a search of person or property, to include residence and vehicle, at 
any time and place by any agent of Field and Community Services and s/he does waive 
constitutional right to be free from such searches." (Ex.1.) Because the search was 
executed not by agents of Field and Community services, but rather by Boise police 
officers without authority, the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress. 
Both the United States and Idaho Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches 
seizures. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; ID. CONST. art. I § 17. A search without a warrant 
is per se unreasonable unless it falls within one of the exceptions to the Fourth 
Amendment requirements. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). One such exception to the warrant requirement is 
searches conducted with consent voluntarily given by a person who has the authority to 
do so. See e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218,222 (1973). "It is well settled 
that when the basis for a search is consent, the state must conform its search to the 
limitations placed upon the right granted by the consent. State v. Turek, 150 Idaho 745, 
749, 250 P.3d 796, 800 (Ct. App. 2011). The standard for measuring the scope of a 
consent to search is that of objective reasonableness. State v. Barker, 136 Idaho 728, 
731, 40 P.3d 86, 89 (2002), citing Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991 ). 
The scope of Mr. Armstrong's waiver was limited to searches conducted by 
agents of Field and Community Services. As argued above, the Boise police officers 
were not such agents. As a result, the search exceeded the scope of Mr. Armstrong's 
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Thus, the warrantless search was not conducted pursuant to a valid exception 
the warrant requirement and was se unreasonable. 
Evidence discovered as a result of the illegal search must be excluded as the 
"fruit of the poisonous tree." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); see also 
State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511 (2012) (holding that the exclusionary rule is a judicially 
created remedy for searches and seizures that violate the constitution). As such, the 
district court erred when it denied Mr. Armstrong's motion to suppress. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the above argument and authority, Mr. Armstrong respectfully 
requests that this Court vacate the district 
the order which denied his motion to suppress. 
DATED this 6th day of May, 2014. 
judgment of conviction and reverse 
State Appellate Public Defender 
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